In a decisive and unprecedented move, India has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) with Pakistan, a day after the tragic terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir’s Pahalgam that claimed the lives of 26 people, including several tourists. The suspension marks one of the most significant steps in a list of punitive measures initiated by New Delhi in the wake of the attack, signaling a serious escalation in diplomatic and strategic pressure on Islamabad.
The Indus Waters Treaty, brokered by the World Bank and signed in 1960, governs the usage and distribution of the waters from the Indus river system, comprising the main Indus River and its five tributaries — Ravi, Beas, Sutlej, Jhelum, and Chenab. The Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej (Eastern Rivers) were allocated to India, while the Jhelum, Chenab, and Indus (Western Rivers) were assigned to Pakistan, with India retaining limited usage rights. Kabul River, a right-bank tributary of the Indus, does not flow through Indian territory and remains outside the treaty’s framework.
According to former Indus Water Commissioner Pradeep Kumar Saxena, India’s decision to suspend the treaty is just the beginning and could potentially lead to its complete abrogation. While the treaty itself has no provision for unilateral withdrawal, Saxena pointed out that Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides a legal pathway for repudiation due to “a fundamental change of circumstances.” India’s move could be interpreted within this framework, considering the repeated instances of cross-border terrorism and deteriorating diplomatic relations.
India, being the upper riparian state, holds significant geographical advantage and control over the flow of the Indus system. With the treaty in abeyance, India is no longer obligated to adhere to strict design and operational restrictions imposed on dam construction and water storage on the Western rivers. This means India can now freely build and operate hydropower and irrigation projects like Kishanganga, Ratle, and others without having to consult Pakistan. In fact, past Indian projects such as Salal, Baglihar, Uri, Chutak, Nimoo Bazgo, Pakal Dul, Miyar, Lower Kalnai, and Kishenganga have all faced objections from Pakistan. The suspension nullifies the need to address such objections going forward.
Further, India is no longer bound by restrictions on “reservoir flushing” — a process that helps remove silt buildup in dams but previously came with strict timing rules under the treaty. Now, such exercises can be conducted anytime, potentially during Pakistan’s crop sowing seasons, which could disrupt irrigation-dependent agriculture in regions like Punjab. The impact on Pakistan’s agrarian economy, already facing water stress, could be significant.
Another major fallout is the suspension of the mandatory data sharing and flood alerts that India was obligated to provide during monsoons. With India now not sharing real-time river data, Pakistan may find itself vulnerable to unexpected flooding, especially during peak rainfall periods. The strategic withholding of such crucial information could leave Pakistan with little time to respond to natural disasters, affecting both civilian populations and critical infrastructure.
Additionally, the treaty mandated annual inspection tours by each country’s Indus Water Commissioners. With the treaty suspended, these official visits may cease, further disrupting cooperative mechanisms and mutual trust built over decades.
At the time of Partition, the boundary between India and Pakistan was drawn right through the Indus basin, with India occupying the upstream position. Two key irrigation headworks at Madhopur (on Ravi) and Ferozepur (on Sutlej), which were crucial to Pakistan’s irrigation network, ended up in Indian territory. This geographic reality made the IWT essential for maintaining water peace between the two nations. However, with the current suspension, India appears to be leveraging its upstream advantage to exert pressure on Pakistan in response to state-supported terrorism.
In 2019, following the Pulwama attack, India had already begun tightening its stance by clearing several new hydropower projects in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. Now, with the treaty effectively put on hold, the diplomatic restraint is off the table, and India has greater freedom to operationalize its water resources for national interest.
This shift signals a new phase in Indo-Pak relations, where water — traditionally kept outside the conflict zone — may now become a tool of strategic leverage. While the long-term implications are still unfolding, one thing is clear: the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty marks a historic turning point, not just in water diplomacy but also in how India responds to acts of terror emanating from across the border.
